Jamming of GPS & GLONASS signals - a study of GPS performance in maritime environments under jamming conditions, and benefits of applying GLONASS in Northern areas under such conditions by Glomsvoll, Øystein
  
 
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING 
NOTTINGHAM GEOSPATIAL INSTITUTE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JAMMING OF GPS & GLONASS 
SIGNALS 
 
A study of GPS performance in 
maritime environments under jamming 
conditions, and benefits of applying 
GLONASS in Northern areas under such 
conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
AUTHOR OEYSTEIN GLOMSVOLL  
SUPERVISOR  DR XIAOLIN MENG 
DATE  24 SEPTEMBER 2014  
 
 
Project thesis submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science in Positioning and Navigation Technology, The University of 
Nottingham. 
1 
 
Abstract 
Growing dependence on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), especially 
GPS, for positioning and navigation at sea has raised a concern about the potential 
risks of signal interference. Technology for jamming is easily available, and in recent 
years there have been many cases of intentional jamming. 
As GPS is the principal means of position fixing used by the Norwegian Navy, 
important questions to find answers to is how vulnerable the GPS and the Electronic 
Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) are to a jamming attack, and further 
whether employing the Glonass satellite system in addition to GPS will provide 
better performance regarding robustness and redundancy when receivers are exposed 
to jamming.  By having a Coast Guard Vessel operating inshore the Norwegian 
fjords as case, this research aims to explore these issues and it does so by asking the 
following research questions: 
- Will employing Glonass in addition to GPS provide better performance in 
Northern areas when the systems are exposed to GNSS jammers? 
- How is the ability of the existing GPS system on board a Norwegian 
Coastguard Vessel to provide a reliable position when there is a jamming 
threat, and how will the ECDIS system on board handle an eventually loss of 
GPS position? 
 
The study consists of two jamming tests: A static test where focus is to analyze and 
compare the GPS and Glonass system and a dynamic test where the GPS and ECDIS 
system on board is analyzed when exposed to jamming. 
The results from the static test showed that the jammer has effect on large distances, 
and that the different receivers used react differently when exposed to jamming. 
Further, the carrier-to-noise ratios for Glonass are less affected by the jammer, and 
the receiver is able to track Glonass satellites with lower carrier-to-noise ratios than 
GPS satellites. We have seen that utilizing Glonass satellites in addition to GPS 
satellites in the receiver contribute to a later loss of position fix and an earlier 
calculation of new position under difficult jamming conditions. 
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The dynamic test showed that the marine grade GPS receiver is easy to jam. A weak 
jamming signal caused the GPS receivers to give misleading information without 
any warning from itself or the ECDIS system. The ECDIS system provided an 
adequate DR positioning, but there are issues that need to be resolved for better 
functionality. 
As Glonass signals has shown to be more resistant to jamming than GPS signals, 
applying the Glonass system in addition to GPS might provide benefits with regards 
to reliability and redundancy, especially for maritime navigation in Northern areas 
where the Glonass satellites also have higher elevation and better coverage than 
GPS. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Growing dependence on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), especially 
GPS, for positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) has raised a concern about the 
potential risks of signal interference, and since Volpe (2001) informed that GPS is in 
a very high grade vulnerable to intentional and unintentional interference, the 
awareness of the vulnerability of GPS has been a great issue and large concern.  
 
The British QinetiQ study from the same year also states that the UK is growing 
more reliant on GPS for fundamental activities. The report says that “the 
fundamental weakness and vulnerabilities of GPS signal reception should be more 
widely publicized, especially for those services where significant inconvenience or 
critical impact could occur” (QinetiQ 2001:6). One such service is maritime 
navigation, and the report points to that GPS and differential GPS are used 
extensively for Maritime applications and in the case of loss of GPS signal the 
navigators have to revert to traditional means as radar, charts or dead reckoning 
(ibid).  
 
Navigation News has stated that “GNSS systems (particularly GPS) have become the 
mariners’ primary navigation aid, and many vessels have no other means of 
navigation” (Navigation News Nov/Dec 2013:16). GNSS systems used on vessels 
are stand-alone or primarily augmented by differential GNSS. As GNSS signals are 
very weak and travel long distances before they reach the earth, they are vulnerable 
to all sources of interference which can be accidental and deliberate jamming, 
spoofing and unintentional interference. Many systems on a modern bridge are built 
around and very reliant on GNSS, and the implications of GNSS failure could be 
dramatically (Grant et al. 2009). 
 
A Norwegian study (Norwegian Space Center 2013) has also been carried out to 
analyze the vulnerability of GNSS for critical infrastructure in Norway. The report 
supports the findings from Volpe (2001) and QinetiQ (2001) and highlights that the 
risk of intentional radio frequency interference with GNSS signals is an issue that 
should be taken seriously. The risk of intentional interference is considered to be 
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high mainly due to the widespread availability of low-cost and simple jamming 
equipment and the report recommends users who directly or indirectly depend on 
GNSS for positioning, navigation and precise timing to analyze the level of risk and 
implement relevant mitigation measures as required. 
 
In recent years there have been many cases of intentional jamming, and the 
technology for jamming is easily available. A lot of research has been conducted 
with regards to jamming equipment and jamming of GPS, and when it comes to 
maritime navigation especially Grant et al. (2010) claim that there is a need for a 
more resilient GNSS for PNT, and emphasize that the terrestrial navigation system 
eLoran
1
 would be the best solution. There has however been limited research on 
jamming of the Russian GNSS system, Glonass, which is today full operational on 
an equal basis as GPS. 
1.2 Research Aim 
As GPS is the principal means of position fixing used by all classes of mariner in 
ocean and coastal navigation important question to find answer to are how 
vulnerable the GPS and the electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS) 
on a Coast Guard Vessel operating inshore the Norwegians fjords are to a jamming 
attack? A study was therefore conducted on board the Norwegian Coast Guard 
Vessel “Farm”. 
 
Further, as we know that GPS is vulnerable and eLoran not yet is available, it would 
be of interest to investigate if there are some benefits of utilizing the Glonass system 
in addition to GPS for navigation applications when there is a threat of jamming. 
Although Glonass provides better satellite coverage in Northern sea areas, there are 
no Norwegian military vessels benefiting from this system. An important aim of this 
research is therefore to find out if Glonass utilized together with GPS is able to 
provide better redundancy and robustness when the GNSS receivers are exposed to 
jamming. 
                                                          
1
 Enhanced Long Range Navigation 
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1.3 Research objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the performance of standalone static L1 C/A 
code GPS and combined GPS + Glonass receivers in tracking and acquisition mode 
when exposed to a jammer. As Norwegian Coast Guard Vessels normally utilize 
only the GPS system for navigation this research is conducted in order to investigate 
if employing the Glonass satellite system in addition to GPS will provide better 
robustness and redundancy, especially for maritime navigation in Northern areas 
where there potentially could be a jamming threat. When measuring performance the 
carrier-to-noise ratios of the signals from each satellite system will be of main focus. 
 
Further, to assess the navigation system on board, the existing marine grade GPS 
receiver and chart system on board the Coast Guard Vessel will be investigated when 
it is affected by the same jammer. To assess the performance of this receiver it will 
be compared to a survey grade and consumer grade receiver. 
 
The research questions are therefore: 
 
- Will employing Glonass in addition to GPS provide better performance in 
Northern areas when the systems are exposed to GNSS jammers? 
- How is the ability of the existing GPS system on board a Norwegian 
Coastguard Vessel to provide a reliable position when there is a jamming 
threat, and how will the ECDIS system on board handle an eventually loss of 
GPS position? 
1.4 Thesis outline 
Chapter 2, the literature review, gives a brief overview of the signal structure of GPS 
and Glonass, and further defines radio frequency interference and characterizes 
jamming signals. Typical classification of jamming devices and their signal 
characteristics will be studied. Further, jamming effects on signal processing in the 
receivers will be discussed, and there will be a focus on jammers’ influence on 
carrier-to-noise ratios. Relevant research on GNSS jamming will be discussed and 
the last part of the literature review will cover jamming in a maritime setting. 
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Chapter 3 describes the methods applied for this research. First the methods for the 
static jamming test are discussed and then the methods for the dynamic jamming test 
on board the Coast Guard Vessel are described. The scope for each part will be 
presented and the chapter further covers the equipment used, the test setup, the 
procedure, and the data-analysis techniques. The way the results in the following 
chapter are presented will be described and research design issues and limitations 
will be discussed. 
Chapter 4 consists of the results and a discussion part. The static jamming test is first 
covered with focus on carrier-to-noise ratios and precision in the code solution of the 
different receivers. A comparison of this live jamming test to a simulator jamming 
test is further made. The dynamic jamming test is then discussed with focus on the 
jammer’s effects on the GPS receivers and the performance of the ECDIS when it 
lost its position input from the GPS. 
Chapter 5 presents a conclusion to the static and dynamic jamming test, and Chapter 
6 gives recommendations for further work. 
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2 Literature review 
The literature review will give a brief overview of the GNSS systems with focus on 
GPS and Glonass. It will further study interference and look at the jamming signal 
from handheld devices which are currently easily available on internet and what 
effect those signals have on the GNSS signals and receivers. Moreover, there will be 
a closer look at some earlier research on how jamming can degrade the GNSS, 
especially with focus on the carrier-to-noise ratios, and in the end look at two trials 
that have been carried out by GLA
2
 to see how jamming can influence maritime 
applications. 
2.1 Overview of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) 
Today there are two operational global navigation satellite systems, the United 
States` GPS and the Russian Glonass. China is on their way on expanding its 
regional Beidou and the European Union has its own system Galileo under 
development. A common term of these satellite systems with global coverage is 
GNSS, and the systems work in approximately the same way (Hofmannn-Wellenhof 
2008).  
2.1.1 Signal Structure GPS 
All GPS satellites transmit continuous signals on the same two center frequencies L1 
(1575.42 MHz) and L2 (1227.60 MHz). One signal for civilian users (Standard 
Positioning Service – SPS) and one encrypted signal for users authorized by the US 
Department of Defense are transmitted on L1, and the signal intended for authorized 
user is also transmitted on L2. The signal structure for SPS is public and described in 
detail in “Interface specification IS-GPS-200E” (Global Positioning Systems Wing 
2010). 
 
Although each satellite uses the same carrier frequencies they are modulated by a 
unique binary ranging code. This is the pseudorandom noise (PRN) code where the 
SPS codes for civilian users are called C/A (coarse/acquisition) code and the PPS 
codes for authorized users are the P(Y) codes. The C/A-code consists of a sequence 
of 1023 bits (chips) and is emitted at the frequency 1.023 MHz which repeats itself 
every millisecond. The P(Y)-code is a very long 10.23 MHz PRN- code and has a 
                                                          
2
 The General Lighthouse Authorities of the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
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period of one week. As the wavelength for the P(Y) code is shorter than the C/A-
code, the precision in range measurement is better (Bingley 2013). 
 
In addition to the carrier and ranging codes, GPS transmits a 50 Hz binary navigation 
data message (20ms bit duration). The navigation message has the following 
information: GPS time, satellite clock offset, satellite status and health, satellite 
ephemeris date and almanac which contains coarse orbit and status information for 
all satellites and data related to error corrections. The L1 carrier transmits the C/A 
code, P(Y)-code and the navigation message, and the L2 carrier transmits the P(Y)-
code and navigation message. The transmission scheme is called CDMA (Code 
Division Multiple Access) which is a form of spread spectrum.  This technique 
allows differentiating between the satellites although they transmit on the same 
frequencies (Bingley 2013). 
 
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DS-SS) is used to spread the bandwidth and 
energy of the signal. The C/A-code is spread mainly over a 2 MHz wide frequency 
band and the P(Y) code is spread over about 20 MHz, all centered at the carrier 
frequency which is shown in Figure 2.1. The power spectral density is then reduced 
while the signal power is unchanged.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Power spectra of GPS signals on L2 and L1 (Misra & Enge 2012) 
 
The three primary reasons for using DS-SS in satellite navigation (Kaplan & Hegarty 
2006:115) are: 
- “The frequent phase inversions in the signal introduced by the PRN 
waveform enable precise ranging by the receiver. 
14 
 
- The use of different PRN sequences enables multiple satellites to transmit 
signals simultaneously and at the same frequency. A receiver can distinguish 
among these signals based on their different codes. For this reason, the 
transmission of multiple DS-SS signal having different spreading sequences 
on a common carrier frequency is referred to as code division multiple 
access (CDMA). 
- DS-SS provides significant rejection of narrowband interference”. 
 
Also Misra & Enge (2012:373) argue that the reason to use spread spectrum is its 
ability to combat radio frequency interference. Spread spectrum technique has been 
used in military applications for many years. Such use of noise-like carrier waves 
and bandwidths much wider than required had originally two motivations: to resist 
enemy efforts to jam the communication or to hide the fact that communication was 
even taking place (Burel 2000). 
2.1.2 Signal structure Glonass 
While GPS is maintained by the US Government, Glonass is operated by the Russian 
Aerospace Defense Forces and has 24 operational satellites. Figure 2.2 shows the 
frequency allocations for Glonass, referred as G1 and G2, and GPS (L1 and L2). In 
addition the modernized G3 and L5 band together with the Galileo bands are 
illustrated together with possible interference sources. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: GNSS Frequency allocation (Navipedia 2014) 
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Unlike GPS each Glonass satellite transmits on slightly different carrier frequencies 
within the G-bands. The high accuracy code is transmitted on both G1 and G2 and 
the standard accuracy code on G1 (all satellites) and G2 (Glonass-M satellites). The 
standard accuracy signal has a PRN code consisting of 511 chips which are repeated 
with a period of 1 ms and a chipping rate of 0.511 Mega chips per second (Mcps). 
The high accuracy signal has a period of 1 second and a chipping rate of 5.11 Mcps. 
In comparison to GPS the navigation data message is transmitted at the same rate (50 
bps) but the chipping rates of the two Glonass signals are half those of GPS C/A and 
P(Y)-codes (Misra & Enge 2012).  
 
Glonass satellites transmit the same PRN code at different frequencies using a 14-
channel frequency division multiple access (FDMA). The RF carriers are 
channelized, and at G1 the channel spacing is 0.5625 MHz with 7 channels lower 
than the center frequency, 1 channel at the center frequency of 1602 MHz and 6 
channels higher. The lowest channel has thus center on 1598.06 MHz and the upper 
most channel has center on 1605.38 Mhz.  
 
These differences in carrier frequencies imply low cross correlations between the 
FDMA signals, but the negative side is that a receiver needs to synthesize many 
frequencies. Misra & Enge (2012) speculates on the reason why Glonass chose 
FDMA instead of CDMA, and suggest it is because a single tone jammer can take 
out one satellite signal at most in an FDMA system but all signals in a CDMA 
system. 
2.1.3 Signal power 
GNSS signals are very weak compared to man-made signals generated on the 
surface. The radio frequency (RF) power at the antenna input port of a satellite is 
about 50 watts, and the satellite antenna spreads the RF signal evenly over the 
surface of earth. The transmitted power is attenuated mainly because of the signal 
transmission path loss, and it decays with the distance squared when it travel from its 
orbit to the user (Misra & Enge 2012). 
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The specifications for the GPS states that the minimum received power level for the 
users on the earth should be -158.5 dBW for the C/A-code on L1 and -160 dBW for 
the P(Y) code on L2 (Global Positioning Systems Wing 2010). This is around 10
-6 
W 
and is well below the background RF noise level sensed by an antenna on the 
receiver. For Glonass the normalized minimum power should not be less than -157 
dBW on G1 (Misra & Enge 2012). 
 
Misra & Enge (2012) and Last (2010) argue that the extremely low signal power that 
reach the receiver is the Achilles` heel of GPS and support Volpe (2001) by 
highlighting the concern about the vulnerabilities of the weak powered signals as we 
rely more and more on GPS.  
2.2 Influences on GNSS measurements 
The computed range between the satellite and receiver contains biases and errors. 
The pseudorange is corrupted by receiver and satellite clock offset and atmospheric 
biases from the ionosphere and troposphere. The ionosphere delay the signal caused 
by charged particles and radiation from the sun and in the troposphere the variations 
in atmospheric pressure, temperature, partial water vapor and weather events have 
effect on the signal. The effects from the troposphere can to some extent be modelled 
and corrected. Use of two or more carrier frequencies will minimize the ionospheric 
effect on the range (Bingley 2013).  
 
When the receivers receive reflected signals from surfaces near the antenna 
multipath occur. Since the path travelled by a reflection is longer than the direct path, 
observed pseudorange will be too long. If an object obstructs the satellite signal on 
its path to the GNSS receiver shadowing effects will occur.  
 
The range is also influenced by the geometric distribution of the satellite 
constellation at the time of measurement. This geometry is measured by the DOP 
(dilution of precision) parameters. A high accuracy is represented by a low DOP 
value where there is an even overall dispersion of the satellites while low accuracy 
with a high DOP value can occur when there is a cluster of satellites in one segment 
of the sky (Kaplan & Hegarty 2006). For mariners who navigate at sea level the 
value of Horizontal DOP (HDOP) is important to be aware of. 
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Figure 2.3: Factors impacting GNSS performance (Norwegian Space Center 2013) 
All these influences shown on Figure 2.3 have impact on the reliability of civilian 
type GNSS receivers, and it is important to understand how to mitigate or recognize 
the presence of them. To use GPS receivers with confidence, knowledge of the 
influences described above is required (Niekerk & Combrinck 2012). Another 
serious impact is the susceptibility of civilian GNSS receivers to jamming. When 
doing an assessment of the vulnerability of the GNSS-system it is of high importance 
to recognize all these factors which contribute to the performance of GNSS. 
2.3 Radio frequency interference 
Radio frequency signals from any undesired source that are received by a GNSS 
receiver are considered as interference. A result of such interference can be degraded 
navigation accuracy or complete loss of receiver tracking (Kaplan & Hegarty 2006). 
 
Volpe (2001) and Hofmann-Wellenhof (2008) differentiate interference into 
unintentional and intentional interference. Unintentional interference can come from 
among others broadcast television, VHF transmitters and personal electronic devices. 
Findings with regards to unintentional interference in the Volpe-report were that 
GPS is susceptible to such interference and also ionospheric effects and signal 
blockage, and the effects were most noticeable to SPS users who use single 
frequency. 
 
Intentional interference is further categorized into jamming, spoofing (false signal) 
and meaconing (rebroadcasting). Jamming is defined as “the emission of radio 
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frequency energy of sufficient power and with the proper characteristics to prevent 
receivers in the target area from tracking the GPS signal” (Volpe 2001:30). 
2.3.1 Characterization of jamming signals 
Radio frequency interference (RFI) can be pulsed or continuous. Continuous RFI can 
be classified by its bandwidth and is usually differentiated into broadband or 
narrowband (Kaplan & Hegarty 2006:244). This classification is relative to the 
GNSS band, and implies that a broadband RFI has a bandwidth equal or greater than 
the GNSS bandwidth (2 MHz for the GPS C/A-code) and a narrowband RFI has a 
narrower bandwidth. An interference signal consisting of a single tone is called a 
continuous wave (CW) which is concentrated in a very narrow band around the 
center frequencies. The CW signal is probably the simplest form of interference.  
 
Moreover, jamming signals can be characterized by its center frequency, whether it 
is in band or out of band interference, and by its power which is normally expressed 
as jammer-to-signal power (J/S) in unit of dB. 
2.3.2 Classification of jamming devices and their signal characteristics 
Mitch et al. (2011) have tested 18 of the current commercially available handheld 
civilian GNSS jammers with regards to signal properties, and they were grouped into 
three categories based on power source and antenna type. This categorization is also 
adopted by Kraus et al. (2011): 
1. Jammers designed to plug into a 12 Volt car cigarette lighter socket. These 
jammers usually have low transmitting power (below 100mW) and 
possibility to connect an external antenna. 
2. Jammers powered by battery and equipped by an external antenna connected 
via an SMA connector. Some of the jammers are able to transmit on both the 
L1 and L2 frequency bands, and the transmit power is up to 1W. 
3. Jammers disguised as a harmless electronic device, f.ex. cell phones. They 
have no external antenna and these jammers normally use sawtooth 
frequency modulation. 
 
All of these jammers broadcasted power at or near the L1 carrier frequency and six 
of them broadcasted power at the L2 carrier frequency. 
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Figure 2.4 shows the result of the analysis of a typical jammer from Mitch´s Group 
1. On the upper graph, frequency vs. time is plotted and the lower graph shows 
power vs. time. The upper graph shows a series of linear chirps. Each sweep is on 9 
microseconds and covers a range of about 14MHz which include the civilian L1 
band. The center frequency is the red horizontal line where the power was measured 
to 22mW. 
 
Figure 2.4: Signal characteristics for a group 1 jammer (Mitch et al. 2011). 
Most of the jammers in this research transmitted signals with bandwidths exceeding 
the 2 MHz civilian GPS C/A signals, and some of them had bandwidth exceeding the 
20 MHz P(Y) signal. The majority of the jamming signals were generated by 
frequency modulation of a continuous wave (CW) signal with some sort of swept 
tone method to generate broadband interference and most of the jammers used linear 
chirp signals. 
 
Handheld GNSS jammers were also tested in a study at the University of Federal 
Armed Forces in Munich (Kraus et al. 2011). In accordance with Mitch et al. (2011) 
this test shows that most jamming devices generate broadband interference. In this 
case two of the devices transmitted a signal at a single frequency close to the center 
frequency of L1 that varied with the temperature of the device. The bandwidth of 
these signals was less than 1 kHz and it could be modeled as CW interference. 
Figure 2.5 shows the spectrum generated by those two receivers (Jammer 1). Such 
interference is significantly attenuated by the spread spectrum nature of GNSS codes 
(Pullen & Gao 2012). The broadband interference generated by most of the jammers 
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is showed in the right graph in Figure 2.5. The bandwidth of the broadband jamming 
signal on the figure is about 12 MHz with center frequency close to L1. This 
spectrum is created by rapidly varying the frequency of a CW-like signal, and the 
frequency in this example changes linearly from about L1-6MHz to L1+6MHz 
(Pullen & Gao 2012). 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Spectrum of CW (1) and broadband jammer (2) (Kraus et al. 2011) 
Axell et al. (2013) states with reference to Mitch et al. (2011) and Pullen & Gao 
(2012) that the current development of GPS jammers with power in the range of 1 to 
100 Watt is extensive and even more advanced jammers than those in the three 
categories as described above is about to appear on the market. 
2.3.3 Jamming effects on signal processing 
The reason why the receiver can extract the low powered GNSS signal is the 
knowledge of the signal structure (PRN code). “Processing gain” is the signal boost 
realized by this mean, and if the noise level is raised by RF interference or jamming 
there could not be enough available processing gain to extract the signal (Misra & 
Enge 2012:42). The spread spectrum technique makes it possible to correlate the 
GNSS signals out from below the background noise.  
 
GNSS is very tolerant of pulsed RFI, even if it is very powerful, because the pulses 
usually are short in comparison to the duration of a GPS or Glonass data bit, which is 
20ms. On the other side GNSS has difficulty to handle continuous RFI whether it is 
broadband or narrowband or tone interference (Misra & Enge 2012). But the spread 
spectrum can attenuate narrowband RFI in the correlation process. Figure 2.6 shows 
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the processing gain of spread spectrum signals against narrowband RFI. The top 
illustration shows the spectrum of the GPS C/A code and narrowband RFI before 
correlation with a code replica in the receiver.  When the receiver correlates the 
incoming signals with replica codes the spectrum of the narrowband jammer spreads 
across the bandwidth as shown in the lower picture and the GPS power is 
concentrated in a narrowband.  
 
 
Figure 2.6: Processing gain of spread spectrum vs. narrowband RFI (Misra&Enge 2012) 
A calculation made by Misra & Enge (2012:508) figures that GPS can tolerate 
approximate a tone jammer with 30 dB more power than the C/A signal and 40 dB 
more power than the P(Y) signal since the P(Y) codes are ten times faster than the 
C/A code. 
 
If the RFI power is spread across a wider bandwidth, the correlation effect has 
opposite effect on the GPS signal. When the replica code is aligned with incoming 
code the receiver will wipe off the incoming code and the GPS spectrum will 
collapse. The incoming signal is then de-spread and the GPS power is concentrated 
in a bandwidth of the navigation data which is 50 Hz (Misra & Enge 2012). 
2.3.4 Carrier-to-noise ratio 
For all receivers jamming will effect in decreased measured signal strength. The 
carrier-to-noise power density ratio C/N0 describes the signal strength, and this ratio 
is a bandwidth-independent index number that relates the carrier power to noise per 
1 Hz bandwidth, and is expressed in dB-Hz. According to Hofmann-Wellenhof 
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(2008) C/N0 is the fundamental navigation signal quality parameter at the receiver. 
This is because there is a functional relation between this quantity and the tracking 
loop. The lowest C/N0 that the receiver can track is the tracking loop threshold. 
 
The noise is generally described by use of a temperature equivalent parameter, the 
thermal noise, which is commonly assumed to be white and Gaussian distributed. 
The noise power density N0 is defined as (Kaplan & Hegarty 2006): 
 
N0 = k T 
 
Where:  
 
k = -228.6 dBW K
-1
 (Boltzmann constant) 
T = Temperature in Kelvin 
 
The noise power density of a typical GNSS receiver is in the order of N0 = -201 to    
-204 dBW Hz
-1
. A GNSS signal with a received power at the antenna of 10
-16 
W      
(-160 dBW) is said to be drown in noise, and for N0 = -204 dBW Hz
-1
 the carrier-to-
noise ratio corresponds to 44 dB-Hz in an unjammed environment. 
 
C/N0 below 34 dB-Hz is characterized as weak signals (Hofmann-Wellenhof 2008). 
Rao and colleagues (2013) consider C/N0 down to 28 dB-Hz for receivers that are 
stationary or moving with low dynamics for acceptable, and for antennas on 
platforms with high dynamics C/N0 threshold levels of between 30-35 dB-Hz 
appears acceptable. The general range of C/N0 values depends on the receiver used 
and on the platform dynamics (Rao et al. 2013). 
 
C/N0 is mainly varying with the elevation of the arriving signal as the signal from 
high elevation satellites has higher signal strength and is less affected by noise as it 
reaches the receiver. In presence of jamming the theoretical effective carrier-to-noise 
density ratio (C/N0)eff  will be as follow: 
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Where: 
 
(C/N0)eff = the effective carrier-to-noise ratio in 1 Hz 
C/N0   = the unjammed carrier-to-noise density ratio in 1 Hz 
J/S  = the jammer-to-signal ratio at the receiver 
Rc = the basic code rate of pseudo random noise (PRN) in chips per 
second 
Q = the parameters of the spectral distribution of the external radio 
emission relative to the desired signal spectrum (Q=2.22 for a wide-
band Gaussian interference (Kaplan & Hegarty 2006)) 
 
When the jammer moves towards the receiver, the received jammer power (J) 
increases relative to the distance (r) according to the free-space loss equation as: 
 
J(r) = Jt (
 
    
)
 
 
 
Where: 
 
J(r) = received jammer power in Watt as a function of range 
Jt = transmitted jammer power (W) 
r = range between jammer and receiver (m) 
f = frequency of the jammer (Hz) 
c = speed of light in vacuum (m/s) 
 
The formulas presented above shows that the (C/N0)eff  of a signal will decline as the 
jamming occurs. At the same time signal acquisition, carrier tracking and data 
demodulation will deteriorate. When C/N0 decreases the signals become weaker and 
when the signal is weak enough the receiver cannot generate ranging measurements 
anymore and it is not possible to compute a position solution. 
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Moreover, the equation for (C/N0)eff  shows that a higher PRN code rate theoretically 
will lead to a lower decrease in C/N0 under jamming conditions. 
 
A drawback of using the C/N0 as a measurement of signal quality is that this value 
will decrease both when the GPS receiver is jammed as a result of increased noise, 
and when the desired GPS signals is weakened as a result of decreased carrier power 
(Axell et al. 2013).  
2.4 Research on GNSS jamming 
The military has for many years been aware of the possibility to jam the GPS 
signals. SPS can be denied over a great area caused by low powered jammers, and an 
estimation which was done in 1994 figured that a 1 Watt airborne jammer was able 
to deny GPS tracking to a receiver that had already got lock-on at a distance of 10 
km and that this jammer could prevent acquiring lock at a distance of 85 km (Ward 
1994).  
2.4.1 Receivers ability to determine position 
In recent years there has been carried out additionally research on jamming of 
civilian GPS signals as low powered jammers have become easily available. A study 
for the South African National Defense Force was carried out in order to see how 
easy it is to jam civilian GPS receivers (Niekerk & Combrinck 2012). The 
susceptibility of four different civilian-type GPS receivers to jamming was tested by 
using a standard commercial RF signal generator and passive GPS antennas. The 
signal generator generated a frequency modulation signal on the L1 band at 1575.42 
MHz and the signal output strength varied in steps between -3 dBm (0.5 mW) and 17 
dBm (50 mW).  
 
The initial test was carried out with a jammer power of 13 dBm (20 mW) and the 
GPS receivers were moved away from the jammer. This experiment showed that the 
jammer was able to disrupt all GPS receivers to a distance of approximately 2 km. 
All the receivers were then placed on the ground level at a distance of 2 km from the 
jammer, where they could lock on to the available GPS satellites for establishing of a 
position. The jamming signal generator started on -3dBm and increased until the 
receivers could not establish a position. 
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Table 2.1: The ability of GPS receivers to resist jamming (Niekerk & Combrinck 2012) 
 
 
From Table 2.1 we can see that the Trimble receiver had best resistance to jamming. 
This was attributed to the design of its Zephyr antenna which is able to reject 
multipath signals and thus the receiver could be less sensitive to low elevation 
signals transmitted by the jammer at ground level.  An observation was also that the 
Garmin eTrex gain better result than Garmin 60CSX which is a more sophisticated 
receiver. The most sophisticated receiver, the Topcon, was easiest to jam. There was 
also a significant difference between receivers on their ability to resist jamming at 
different signal strengths. The authors concluded that it is easy to disrupt the 
reception of civilian GPS receivers and that “jamming remains a serious threat to the 
integrity of navigation that needs further investigation” (Niekerk & Combrinck 
2012:4). 
 
A weakness of this study might be that there is no information about the quality of 
the position when the receivers had the ability to determine it at different jamming 
signal strengths. It would be interesting to study the performance especially when the 
jammer strength is close to the threshold before losing track to the satellites. 
2.4.2 Jammer-to-signal ratios 
Jones (2011) has plotted theoretically values for different CW broadband jammers 
with power from 10mW to 1kW in Figure 2.7. The limitation of the amount of non-
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GNSS interference the receivers can handle when they are still acquiring or tracking 
the desired signal is the maximum jammer-to-signal ratio (J/S).The J/S decreases 
with the distance from jammer to receiver. In the same graph the horizontal dashed 
lines show some typical receiver thresholds. 
 
Figure 2.7: The effect of various jammers on GPS receivers (Jones 2011) 
As we can see from Figure 2.7, a small 10 mW jammer is able to prevent acquisition 
to C/A code on distances shorter than 10 km. A receiver that has lock on to the C/A 
code will in theory lose it when it is nearer the10mW jammer than 1 km. In 
comparison a P(Y)-code receiver will lose lock when it is about 300 metres from the 
same jammer. If a C/A- receiver is exposed to a jammer on 1 Watt it will lose lock 
on a distance of 10 km. These values are also supported by the findings from Ward 
(1994) with regards to an airborne jammer. 
 
Another study (Kuusniemi et al. 2012) based on J/S ratios was conducted at the 
Finnish Geodetic Institute to see how vulnerable consumer grade GPS receivers are. 
A handheld L1 jammer with an output power of 13dBm that transmitted a chirp 
signal with center frequency at 1577 MHz and a spectrum bandwidth of 16.3 MHz 
was used to jam 6 different receivers in a navigation laboratory. The test was 
conducted with two different J/S ratios (15dB and 25dB). The J/S ratio of 25 dB is 
close to the theoretical value of the C/A acquisition threshold illustrated by Jones 
(2011). 
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When exposed for J/S ratio of 25 dB the best performance receiver provided a 
position solution all the time with a maximum horizontal error of 22 metres and the 
worst performance receiver gave position 16% of the time with a maximum 
horizontal error of 129 metres. The report concluded that the performance results 
showed significant difference among the receivers, in line with the results from 
Niekerk & Combrinck (2012). 
2.4.3 Carrier-to-noise ratios 
Bauernfeind et al. (2011) focused attention on carrier-to noise ratios when 
conducting an open-field test of jamming signals from typical available low-cost 
GNSS jammers. This research was done at the Galileo Test Range in Germany, and 
the results presented here are measured by using a jammer transmitting a chirp signal 
with a bandwidth of 11.8 MHz in the L1 band. The effective jammer power was -40 
dBW (0.1mW), and also this jammer belongs to the category broadband interference. 
A multi-frequency Ipex software GNSS receiver was used, and the jammer 
approached this static receiver starting from a distance of 1200 metres. The carrier-
to-noise ratio was measured, and the blue line in Figure 2.8 shows the C/N0 
degradation for this receiver. In addition the red line shows the theoretical curve for 
effective C/N0. 
 
Figure 2.8: C/N0 for Ipex SW Receiver and the theoretical curve (Bauernfeind et al. 2011) 
The authors explain that the measured curves follow the theoretical curves as long as 
the front end is not saturated. For this interval the received jammer power is 
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noticeable above the noise floor. Moreover, “when the front-end analogue to digital 
converter (ADC) is saturated it causes heavily degradation of the signal which 
exceeds the pure degradation caused by the increased jammer power until loss of 
lock of signal” (Bauernfeind et al. 2011). 
Before the front end was saturated the jammer degraded the correlation process by 
raising the noise floor, and this degradation caused positon errors of more than 50 
metres just before the receiver lost track, as shown in Figure 2.9. 
 
Figure 2.9: Accuracy for Ipex SW Receiver (Bauernfeind et al. 2011) 
Also survey grade and mass-market receivers were tested in this experiment, and by 
comparing them they found that the professional receivers were interfered at a 
shorter distance but lose lock on the signal earlier. The main conclusion was also 
here that interference range of a jammer is very dependent on the receiver 
architecture.  
2.4.4 In-band and out-of-band jamming 
The research referred to until now have only studied jammer signals inside the GPS 
L1 band. Another study (Craven et al. 2013) with focus on carrier-to-noise ratios has 
in addition analysed interference centered outside the L1 band. Craven and 
colleagues have under laboratory conditions examined the effect of various 
interference on the tracking capability of a commercially GPS receiver, and the C/N0 
has been measured for the GPS L1 C/A signal to examine the receiver immunity to 
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interference sources. These interference sources were a continuous waveform (CW) 
signal and a broadband Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) signal (48MHz 
bandwidth) both centered on the GPS L1 frequency. The signals from outside the L1 
frequency were signals from a GSM centered at 900 MHz, and a DECT (Digital 
Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications) signal and a LTE (Long Term Evolution) 
signal both centered at 1900 MHz.  
 
Figure 2.10: C/N0 as a function of interference power level (Craven et al. 2013) 
Figure 2.10 illustrates how the receiver C/N0 varies as a function of the interference 
source power level. The result shows that CW and AWGN jamming causes most 
disruption as these interference sources are defined exactly at the GPS L1 center 
frequency. In the presence of the CW interference the receiver lost lock at C/N0 
values of 34.4 versus 27.8 for the AWGN broadband noise. The results also show 
that the interference power of transmissions outside the GPS frequency band needs 
to be significantly higher to affect the receiver’s performance. They further conclude 
that use of multiple GNSS frequencies will provide jamming immunity because the 
effect of an intentional interference source which is targeted at a particular GNSS 
frequency band will likely be less pronounced within an adjacent GNSS frequency 
band. 
2.4.5 Jamming of GPS and Galileo 
To supplement this review a research which also has implemented Galileo reception 
under jamming condition follows. In the absence of available jamming research on 
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Glonass it is interesting to study how resistant other GNSS systems than GPS are to 
jamming.  
Borio et al. (2013) have investigated the impact of a jammer on GPS and Galileo 
L1/E1 signal reception. Their experiment was conducted in a GNSS simulator with a 
survey grade GNSS antenna connected to four commercial GNSS receivers. A 
cigarette-lighter jammer broadcasting a single saw-tooth chirp signal with a 
bandwidth of 12MHz was used (Group 1 jammer according to Mitch et al. (2011)). 
An attenuator was applied to vary the transmitted power and simulate different 
values of received jammer-to-noise ratio (J/N0). The relationship between J/N0 and 
time was linear starting on a low J/N0 which was increased to the highest level at the 
middle of the test time and then decreased. 
 
Figure 2.11: C/N0 loss by four receivers when processing GPS L1 C/A (Borio et al. 2013) 
Figure 2.11 shows the average loss in C/N0 experienced in the presence of the 
jammer as a function of the J/N0 for the receivers. Receivers 1-3 are survey grade 
multi-frequency receivers from three different manufacturers and receiver 4 is a high 
sensitivity single frequency GPS only receiver. When the jammer was turned on 
there was a clearly negative jump in the C/N0 loss curves, and this jump was 
significantly higher for the survey grade receivers. Borio and colleagues (2013) 
argue that this is because the HS receiver probably has a front-end bandwidth lower 
than 12 MHz (the bandwidth of the jammer) and only a small part of the noise 
caused by the jammer enters the receiver. Unlike the HS receiver, the survey grade 
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receivers are wideband with front-end bandwidth greater than 12 MHz and therefore 
experienced a greater initial loss. 
Figure 2.12 shows the average C/N0 loss when processing GPS and Galileo signals 
in the presence of the jammer in a software-based receiver. Borio and colleagues 
(2013) state that the GPS and Galileo processing are affected in a similar way but the 
tracking threshold of the Galileo signals is approximately 6 dB lower than that for 
the GPS signals. They argue that this is due to the use of a pure PLL processing 
strategy using only the E1C (pilot) component of the Galileo signal. 
 
Figure 2.12: Average C/N0 loss for GPS and Galileo signals (Borio et al. 2013) 
Borio and colleagues (2013) argue that since the jammer signal is wideband, GPS 
and Galileo signals are affected in a similar way. They further claim that receiver 
front-end has a greater impact in determining the jamming impact than the signal 
type, and they have shown that narrow band front-ends better shield the receiver 
against interference. Professional receivers showed a quite similar performance 
whereas the HS receiver was more resilient to jamming. 
2.4.6 Effect of solar radio emission interference on Glonass reception 
As there is a gap in research on jamming effects on Glonass, solar radio emission 
interference, which can be compared to broadband jamming, will be discussed. 
Vladislav and colleagues (2013) have studied GPS/Glonass performance under 
strong solar radio emission interference, and their experimental results showed that 
GPS receivers presented lower noise immunity and that Glonass receivers functions 
more reliably under conditions with solar emission interference.  
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In this study, solar radio emission was considered as white Gaussian noise, and the 
emission intensity was constant within the frequency band of the satellite signal. 
Further assumptions were that the front-end passband of the GPS receiver radio path 
was 3 MHz and the passband for each separate Glonass satellite was 0.5 MHz, which 
are typical receiver values for GPS and Glonass (Kaplan & Hegarty 2006). The solar 
emission was therefore only considered in these narrow frequency bands. 
The result showed that when the solar emission level was increasing the GPS C/A 
signals carrier-to-noise ratios started to descend earlier and was reduced more 
noticeably than the Glonass signals. When the solar emission reached a maximum 
level of 10
6 
sfu (solar flux units) the GPS C/N0 fell below the threshold of minimum 
allowable C/N0 at the receiver input while the Glonass C/N0 still was above this 
threshold. The fall of GPS C/N0 at that point was 13 dB whereas the fall for Glonass 
C/N0 was 9 dB. 
Vladislav and colleagues (2013) explained the better performance of Glonass as a 
result of the narrower front-end passband of the Glonass receiver for the separate 
Glonass satellites compared to the GPS receivers. As Glonass uses FDMA 
technology to separate the signals of each Glonass satellites it requires to set a 
narrower RF frontend bandwidth compared to GPS. The main expected consequence 
is lower integral noise power at the analog to digital converter (ADC) input of the 
navigation receiver. Therefore lower integral power of the solar radio noise will 
penetrate into a Glonass receiver compared to the GPS, and Glonass can perform its 
function more reliably under such conditions. 
2.5 Maritime GPS and jamming 
In order to identify the effects of GPS jamming on safe navigation at sea, the GLA 
together with the UK Government`s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory 
have conducted a series of two sea trials. 
 
In 2008 a GPS jamming exercise off the coast of Flamborough Head was carried out 
on the vessel “Pole Star” (Grant et al. 2009). The purpose was among others to 
investigate the effect from jamming on maritime navigation and safety and to see 
how mariners cope with a loss of GPS as primary navigation. In this research a 
jammer with power of 1.5W (2dBW) was used to provide a jamming signal over the 
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whole 2MHz bandwidth of the civilian GPS L1 frequency. The coverage area of this 
jammer situated 25 metres above the ground was out to 30 kilometres. 
 
When the vessel entered and exited the jamming region the jamming power was 
weak, and the two marine grade GPS receivers on board provided position errors up 
to tens of kilometres away from the true location. The further loss of GPS inside the 
jamming region caused many alarms on the bridge which all were linked to the 
failure of different functions to acquire and calculate their GPS position, among 
others the Automatic Identification System (AIS), the dynamic positioning system, 
the ship’s gyro calibration system and the digital selective calling system 
(emergency communication system). 
Table 2.2: Jamming effects observed on the Pole Star vessel in 2008 (Grant et al. 2010) 
 
 
The GPS fed equipment was defined to be in one of the three states as defined in 
Table 2.2. The erroneous GPS positions appeared in state 2. Some of the errors were 
only a bit different from the true position, which according to Grant et al. (2010) 
resulted in hazardously misleading information. Further finding during this test was 
that the main chart and positioning system, the ECDIS, stopped updating because of 
the GPS failure, which caused a static screen.  
 
The second GPS jamming trial was conducted in 2010 off the coast of Newcastle-
Upon-Tyne (Grant et al. 2010). Two scenarios were demonstrated; one with full 
signal denial where the jamming signal was significantly greater than the GPS signal 
and another with comparable signals where the jamming signal was slowly 
increased. The findings on a typical marine grade GPS receiver was that when the 
jamming signal was comparable with the received GPS signal, data with error was 
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observed and wandering positions at high speed was reported. When the jamming 
signal increased the receiver failed to provide any positioning, navigation or timing 
output. In this case the ECDIS gave an alarm and closed down. 
 
Enhanced Loran (eLoran) was also tested during the second trial, and this system 
was not surprisingly unaffected by GPS jamming. A closing remark from Grant et al. 
(2010) was that in the future the combination of GPS, Galileo and eLoran will 
provide robust and resilient PNT in order to provide safety at sea. They put no 
emphasize on the fact that there is already another operational GNSS system 
(Glonass) that used in addition to GPS might provide better performance in a 
jamming environment. 
 
These two dynamic trials concluded that GPS denial have significantly effects on 
maritime navigation and safety. GPS is vulnerable, and jamming can cause 
misleading information and the level of disruption is dependent on the make and 
model of the equipment installed, the configuration of the equipment and the signal 
strength of the jamming signal (Grant et al. 2010). 
2.6 Conclusion 
It is today easy to jam a civilian GNSS receiver, and the receivers react differently 
when exposed to jamming. Jammers are easily available and they are very effective 
against civilian receivers on quite large distances. Most of these relatively simple 
jamming devices generate broadband interference (Mitch et al. 2011; Kraus et al. 
2011). 
 
There have been a number of studies where the signal properties of different GNSS 
jammers have been surveyed and their effect on receivers have been measured by 
use of GNSS simulators (Borio et al. 2013; Mitch et al. 2011; Kuusniemi et al. 
2012). In South Africa and Germany also real outdoor GPS jamming tests have been 
conducted (Niekerk & Combrinck 2012; Bauernfeind 2011). The findings from these 
studies are generally that the combination of high sensitivity GPS receivers and the 
low signal strength from the satellites make GPS receivers vulnerable to jamming. 
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There is however limited research where both GPS and Glonass signals have been 
tested with regards to jamming, and where the performance of combined GPS + 
Glonass receivers have been assessed. This study therefore aims to fill this research 
gap. 
 
Previous research have shown that it make sense to study C/N0 under jamming 
conditions as this is an important quality indicator. The studies referred to which 
focused on C/N0 discussed that ratio when the receiver was in tracking phase. Since 
code acquisition requires a higher C/N0 than for tracking it will also be of interest to 
study C/N0 during the acquisition under jamming conditions.  
 
Moreover, studies have showed that jamming of a maritime GPS has dramatically 
effects on maritime navigation and safety as many systems on board a vessel depend 
on the single GPS receiver (Grant et al. 2009; Grant et al. 2010). Grant and 
colleagues  (2010) claimed that eLoran is the solution for resilient PNT. To set up 
this system a lot of infrastructure is required, and until that is built there might be 
some advantages of utilizing systems that are already operational. Therefore it would 
be of interest to investigate how jamming affects the Glonass signals, and assess 
whether there are any benefits of using Glonass in combination with GPS when it 
comes to robustness and reliability. 
 
Moreover, Grant et al. (2010) only discussed the performance of marine grade 
receivers in the dynamic trials. As most of the research papers referred to in this 
literature review emphasized the fact that jamming is dependent on which receiver 
that are used, it would also be interesting to test handheld consumer grade and 
survey grade receivers exposed to jamming in a marine environment in order to 
make a comparison to a typical marine grade receiver. 
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3 Methodology 
This jamming test is divided into two parts; a static test and a dynamic test. The both 
parts of the test were conducted in an area north of the Polar Circle in the northern 
part of Norway (68°57’N - 016°45’E). Permission to conduct jamming in this area 
was given by the Norwegian Post and Telecommunication Authority under 
restrictions that the test had to be aborted if there were other vessels closer than 3 
kilometres to the jammer source or if fog, heavy snow or rain shower made the 
visibility poor. The Norwegian National Headquarter for the Armed Forces also had 
to be informed during all stages of the test. 
3.1 Methodology part 1: Jamming of static receivers 
3.1.1 Scope  
The scope of the first part is to analyse the carrier-to-noise ratios of GPS L1 
frequency signals and Glonass G1 frequency signals received by a survey grade 
receiver when exposed to a jammer. The effects of interference are studied with 
focus on the carrier-to-noise ratios as an indicator of the quality of the received GPS 
and Glonass signals from each available satellite. This makes it possible to estimate 
GPS and Glonass noise immunity. The performance of static standalone survey 
grade and consumer grade GNSS receivers used in combined GPS + Glonass mode 
versus pure GPS mode will be assessed with regards to error in the pseudorange 
position solution, and the effective range in which a low-powered handheld jammer 
has effect on these receivers will be measured. Measurements of interference 
influence on GNSS signal acquisition and tracking in a real outdoor environment 
when the jamming source is applied on different distances are conducted.  
3.1.2 Equipment 
A Leica GS10 geodetic dual frequency receiver and a handheld consumer grade high 
sensitivity Garmin etrex 20 receiver were used. Both of the receivers are able to 
provide a position solution using a combined GPS + Glonass mode in addition to 
GPS only mode. The Garmin receiver has an integrated antenna, and the Leica GS10 
receiver was connected to a Leica AS10 antenna (see Appendix A for further 
specifications).  
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Figure 3.1: Leica GS10 receiver and Leica AS10 antenna  
 
Figure 3.2: Garmin etrex 20 receiver 
 
Figure 3.3: L1 frequency jammer (SkyDec) 
As previously discussed most illegal jammers are centered on the GPS L1 frequency. 
Therefore a jammer which broadcasted radio frequency interference centered at the 
L1 carrier frequency was chosen. Figure 3.3 shows the handheld GNSS jamming 
device delivered by SkyDec which was applied for this test. The centre frequency of 
the jammer is 1575.42 MHz and the bandwidth is 60MHz F0. The jammer then 
covers the frequencies 1545.42 – 1605.42 MHz, and all the 14 Glonass channels on 
G1 are also covered in the very upper part of the frequency band of the jammer. The 
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jammer is thus categorized as a broadband jammer, and the average jamming power 
of this device was measured to 0.33mW (-35 dBW). The jamming power was 
constant during the trial. To vary the interference strength at the antenna of the 
GNSS receivers, the jammer approached and was removed from the receivers by use 
of a small boat. 
3.1.3 Test setup 
The Leica and Garmin receivers were set up on land in position D marked with a red 
circle in Figure 3.4. This position is about 3 metres above sea level in an open sky 
environment. In addition a Leica GS10 base station was set up approximate 60 
metres further south in the blue circle (E) (Figure 3.4). Both Leica receivers were set 
to record GNSS raw data every second and the Garmin receiver was set in combined 
GPS + Glonass mode for the first part of the test and GPS only mode for the last part 
logging data every second. Information about number of tracked satellites, their 
numbers and carrier-to-noise ratios (C/N0) of received signals from each satellite at 
the Leica GS10 receivers were recorded in Rinex files. 
 
Figure 3.4: Map of the Site 
3.1.4 Procedure 
The jammer was applied on a small boat and was mounted about 2 metres above sea 
level. The test was repeated four times, and the first trial started with turning on the 
jammer in position A, 2200 metres east of the GNSS receivers. The boat then 
approached on the yellow line towards the GNSS receivers in point D with constant 
speed of approximate 7 m/s and stopped in point C, 50 metres from the receivers. 
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The boat stayed in that position for some seconds before returning back to point B, 
which was in a distance of 1300 metres from the receivers. At point B the jammer 
was turned off.  
The next three trials started with turning on the jammer at point B, and the jammer 
approached point C on the same line before returning to point B again. Each time the 
boat reached point B the jammer was turned off before next trial started. Figure 3.5 
is a photo taken at point D and it shows the small boat that approaches the Leica 
antenna and Garmin receiver. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Photo taken from the position of the receivers (point D) 
 
3.1.5 Data-analysis techniques 
The Rinex data from the two GS10 receivers were post processed in Leica Geo 
Office using double-differencing to get an accurate position of point D in the red 
circle. Further code measurements were applied to give the position solution of GPS 
only and combined GPS + Glonass from the Leica receiver. The Garmin receiver 
provides 3D position data in GPX-format only, and the precision of the Garmin 
position solution and the two Leica position solutions were then plotted as a time 
series to make comparison.   
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The C/N0 values for the GPS and Glonass satellites were extracted from the Leica 
Rinex data using the software TEQC and Matlab, and were further plotted as a time 
series. C/N0 values stated in the Rinex files are that for the code solution, and only 
code solutions will be analysed in this research. HDOP values were extracted from 
the Leica NMEA data. 
3.1.6 Presentation of results 
Firstly, the carrier-to-noise ratios to selected GPS and Glonass satellites are plotted 
for all the four trials in the same diagram together with the distance to the jammer to 
make comparison of GPS and Glonass signals. Further, Trial 1 is studied in detail by 
looking at how the carrier-to-noise ratios relate to the horizontal and height 
precision. Precision is here defined as actual measured position minus the average 
unjammed position, and the absolute values are calculated. 
Calculation of precision rather than accuracy is applied for all the measurements. 
The horizontal accuracy of the unjammed Garmin receiver was about 4-6 metres 
compared to the accurate position in point D, obtained by applying double 
differencing, and the precision for the unjammed periods of the trial was about 0 - 
0.5 metres. Since the measurements of the Garmin precision and Leica precision 
were close to each other, it gives a better overview to compare the precision during 
the unjammed and jammed stages of the test. 
For the Leica and Garmin receivers the precision are plotted for the GPS code 
solution and combined GPS + Glonass code solution. At last the average fall in C/N0 
for GPS and Glonass satellites during the first jamming trial will be plotted and 
compared to findings from the simulator test conducted by Borio and colleagues 
(2013). 
3.1.7 Research design issues and limitations 
This method is chosen because it allows us to assess jamming in both tracking phase 
and acquisition phase. Jamming in tracking phase means that the interference signal 
is turned on after the receiver has performed signal acquisition (i.e. identification of 
SV numbers and carrier/code synchronization). When turning on the jammer at a 
long distance from the receivers (point A and B) and then approach them one can 
assess the receivers’ ability of tracking satellite signals when the power of the 
jamming signal is increasing. 
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Jamming in acquisition phase means that interference signal is present before 
satellite signal may be received. While increasing the distance between GNSS 
receivers and jammer after the receivers have lost the lock, the power of jamming 
signal will decrease and it make it possible to assess the receivers’ ability to acquire 
useful signal in presence of a decreasing interference source. 
Earlier jamming researches have mainly applied a signal generator or attenuator to 
vary the interference power. One exception is the method applied by Bauernfeind 
and colleagues (2011) who used jammers with constant power mounted on a car that 
approached the receivers when they jammed in tracking phase. Their method is quite 
similar to the one that is applied in this study, and their focus was also on measuring 
carrier-to-noise ratios. The similarities in the methods make it easier to compare and 
contrast the results.  
To estimate the distance to the jammers Bauernfeind et al. (2011) applied an 
odometer on the car to get a reference trajectory of the jammer. The reference 
trajectory of the jammer on board the boat in this study is quite inaccurate and this 
might be considered a weakness. When the jammer was turned on, also the 
navigation system on board the small boat was jammed, and the start and stop 
position of this boat had to be measured by use of the radar on board the Coast 
Guard Vessel. Because the speed of the boat was constant, the distance to the 
jammer could be calculated, but the errors of this trajectory are estimated to be up to 
20%. Therefore the time is used as reference on the x-axis in most of the plots and 
the distance to jammer is plotted in its own graph. 
It is also important to be aware of that the task of combining mixed GNSS 
observation from GPS and Glonass in a receiver is subject to biases. Differences in 
coordinate reference frames and time scales as well as inter-channel hardware biases 
have to be taken into account. Therefore focus is set on measuring C/N0 to each 
satellite in both satellite systems since it is possible to extract isolated GPS and 
Glonass measurements from the Rinex data. However, comparing a pure GPS 
position solution to a combined GPS + Glonass position solution might give 
indications of adding the extra Glonass satellites will improve the performance under 
jamming conditions. 
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Another weakness of this research is that the Garmin receiver only provides position 
solution in GPX-format with no information of C/N0 ratios. Hence, only the 
precision in position can be compared to the Leica receiver. Moreover, since only 
one Garmin receiver is used it is not possible to compare a Garmin GPS + Glonass 
solution to a Garmin GPS solution within the same trial. 
3.2 Methodology part 2: Jamming of dynamic receivers 
The second part is a dynamic test where all the measurements are conducted on 
board the Coast Guard Vessel “Farm” (Figure 3.6). 
 
Figure 3.6: The Norwegian Coast Guard Vessel “Farm” 
3.2.1 Scope 
The main marine grade GPS receiver on board will be examined when it is exposed 
to interference, and to make an assessment of its performance it will be compared to 
the performance of the survey grade Leica receiver and the consumer grade Garmin 
receiver also utilized in the static jamming test. Further, carrier-to-noise ratios to the 
GPS satellites will be assessed, and the consequences jamming will have on the 
ECDIS system on board the vessel will be studied with focus on the ability to handle 
a loss of GPS input. 
As the aim of the dynamic test mainly is to assess the vulnerability of the specific 
GPS and chart system on board a Norwegian Coast Guard Vessel, the focus during 
this test will be on GPS performance as this is the only GNSS system applied by the 
Norwegian Navy. Therefore the two additional receivers (Leica and Garmin) brought 
on board were set to record GPS observations only. 
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3.2.2 Equipment and test setup 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Furuno GP90 receiver (www.furuno.com) 
The Coast Guard Vessel is equipped with a stand-alone marine grade Furuno GP90 
GPS receiver (Figure 3.7).  This is a single frequency L1 C/A code receiver with an 
update rate of 1 second, and the receiver is connected to a marine grade Furuno 
GPA019-S antenna mounted on board 13 metres above sea level (Figure 3.8) (See 
Appendix B for further specifications). 
 
Figure 3.8: Furuno GPA019-S antenna 
The similar Leica GS10 and Garmin etrex receivers as used in the first test were 
utilized in this test to make positioning comparison to the Furuno receiver. The Leica 
and Garmin receiver were set to record GPS only with an update rate of 1 second. 
The marine grade Furuno receiver and the Leica receiver were connected to the 
Furuno antenna via a splitter as shown in Figure 3.9. The Garmin receiver was 
fastened beside the vessel’s GPS antenna. 
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Figure 3.9: The splitter and Leica GS10 receiver      
The ECDIS system on board is named TECDIS (Telchart Electronic Chart Display 
and Information System) and is delivered by Furuno. This system is approved 
according to the latest IMO (International Maritime Organisation) regulations. 
The jammer used in this dynamic test is the same as utilized in the first static test, 
and it is applied on the small boat 2 metres above the sea level. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
This test is divided into two trials: 
In the first trial the Coast Guard Vessel was drifting very slowly downstream in a 
north-eastern direction when the jammer approached it from east on a small boat. 
The jammer was turned on at a distance of 3000 metres to the Coast Guard Vessel 
and approached with a speed of about 12 m/s until it was at a closest distance of 50 
metres. 
In the second trial the jammer was stationary on board the small boat and the Coast 
Guard Vessel steered a course towards the jammer with a speed of about 5 knots (2.5 
m/s). The Coast Guard Vessel started at a distance of about 2000 metres to the 
jammer and continued until all GPS based positioning systems had lost its input. 
3.2.4 Data analysis techniques 
Data in form of NMEA sentences was recorded from the Furuno receiver. Rinex data 
was recorded at the Leica receiver, and the code position solution was extracted. 
GPX position files were recorded at the Garmin receiver. In addition the C/N0 was 
extracted from the Leica Rinex file for each available GPS satellite using the same 
method as for the static test.  
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3.2.5 Presentation of results 
The carrier-to-noise ratios for the GPS satellites obtained by the Leica receiver in 
Trial 1 will be plotted. Unlike the static test, the Leica receiver is now connected to a 
marine grade antenna on a dynamic platform. The distance to the jammer will be 
plotted in the same way as in the static test. Further the number of satellites tracked 
by the Leica and Furuno receivers which are connected to the same antenna will be 
compared. 
The position provided by the three receivers will be plotted in Google Earth for Trial 
1 and 2. During Trial 2 also screenshots of the ECDIS system were taken which will 
be used to illustrate its performance. 
3.2.6 Research design issues and limitations 
As discussed in the literature review a result of the first dynamic jamming test 
conducted by GLA was a static ECDIS screen and in the second test the ECDIS 
system closed down. Since the ECDIS systems in both the GLA trials performed an 
inadequate response to the loss of position sensors, this response will especially be 
investigated on the ECDIS system on board the Coast Guard Vessel. The focus of 
the dynamic part of the test will therefore be to assess how the ECDIS system on 
board the Coast Guard Vessel is able to handle a loss of GPS positioning input. 
 
Grant et al. (2010) emphasized that the level of disruption caused by jamming is 
dependent on the make and model of the equipment installed and the configuration 
of this equipment. Therefore, when assessing the ECDIS system it is important to be 
aware that this assessment is valid only for the system with the specific configuration 
that is applied on board this specific Coast Guard Vessel. 
 
Similar to the static test only the Leica receiver provided carrier-to-noise ratios for 
all satellites in view, and therefore no comparison between the different receivers 
with regards to C/N0 will be provided. Further, in this trial there also might be some 
errors with regards to the measurements of the distance to the jammer as this 
measurements has been done by the radar on board the Coast Guard Vessel. 
Further, unlike the static test, jamming is now limited to be conducted when the 
receivers are in tracking phase only. 
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4 Results and Discussion 
The results and discussion chapter is divided into two parts; one for the static 
jamming test and one for the dynamic jamming test. For each part the results will be 
presented first followed by a discussion. 
4.1 Static Jamming Test 
As explained in the methodology chapter, the static jamming test consists of four 
trials. First carrier-to-noise ratios for GPS and Glonass signals throughout all four 
trials will be discussed. Then carrier-to-noise ratios for all satellites and horizontal 
and height precision performance of the receivers during Trial 1 will be studied in 
detail. Further, the horizontal precision for the next two trials are discussed in order 
to support the findings from Trial 1. Moreover, a comparison of the results from 
Trial 1 with the findings to Borio and colleagues (2013) will be provided to see how 
a simulator test relates to a test in the real world, and at the end there will be an 
overall discussion of the findings from the static jamming test. 
4.1.1 Satellite coverage 
At the beginning of the test, before the jammer was turned on, 8 GPS satellites and 8 
Glonass satellites were tracked by the Leica receiver. The skyplot in Figure 4.1 
shows the coverage of the satellites for one hour duration for the time period the test 
was conducted. It summarizes the azimuth and elevation values for each satellite, 
and shows how the satellites move along the sky. Blue letter G denotes GPS 
satellites and red letter R denotes Glonass satellites, and it is worth to notice the 
good Glonass coverage at this high latitude due to the Glonass satellites higher orbit 
inclination compared to GPS satellites. The dark grey area to the east illustrates the 
approaching direction of the jammer. 
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Figure 4.1: Skyplot GPS and Glonass satellites 
4.1.2 Carrier-to-noise ratios 
This part will discuss the carrier-to-noise ratios obtained during the whole static 
jamming session that consisted of four trials within 26 minutes. The time 
representation at the x-axis will be similar for all graphs. 
Figure 4.2 shows the C/N0 values for the whole test period for the two GPS satellites 
G25 and G02. G02 has an elevation of about 40 degrees while G25 has an elevation 
of 70 degrees. The black line illustrates the distance between the receiver and the 
jamming source for the time periods the jammer was turned on. The first trial goes 
from A to D, the second from E to F, the third from G to H and the last trial starts in 
I.  
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Figure 4.2: C/N0 for two GPS satellites (G25 and G02) and distance to jammer vs time 
From this figure we can see that a low elevation satellite is contaminated with more 
noise at all stages. Therefore, less effective jammer power is generally needed to 
loose acquisition for low elevation satellites. Although the two satellites loose 
acquisition at the same time in trial 2 and 3, we can see in trial 1 and 4 that more 
interference power is needed before the receiver lost acquisition to the high elevation 
satellite. 
As the jammer was turned on in the first trial at a distance of 2200 metres from the 
receiver, we can see a clear initial dip in the C/N0 values from both satellites in point 
A as they start to oscillate (Figure 4.2). This effect is also shown by Tong (2011) in a 
simulator test, and similar effects are often seen at the beginning of such an event 
followed by recovery since the receiver compensates (ibid.). After the initial dip it 
seems that the receiver is locked onto a stable position for the period A to B as the 
jammer is approaching. Such C/N0 dips and oscillating when the jammer is turned on 
are also evident in the beginning of the next three trials, as shown in point E, G and I 
(Figure 4.2). 
Further, Figure 4.2 shows that some larger fluctuations in the C/N0 appears when the 
jammer reaches about 1300 metres (point B), and that the C/N0 start to drop with 
approximate the same ratio at a distance of about 950 metres for both the satellites 
(point C). The receiver lost acquisition to G02 at a distance of 200 metres to the 
jammer and G25 at 50 metres, both having a C/N0 of about 31 when loosing 
acquisition. At this trial reacquisition occurred first for G02 when having a C/N0 of 
43 and later for G25 on a C/N0 value of 47. At point D the jammer was turned off at 
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a distance of 1300 metres to the receiver and the fluctuations in C/N0 decreased. The 
C/N0 values can be studied in a similar way for the next three trials. 
In Figure 4.3 the signals from GPS satellite G25 and Glonass satellite R10 are 
compared. These are the satellites with highest elevation (65 – 72 degrees) 
throughout the test and they are close to each other in azimuth in a southern direction 
as shown in the skyplot. 
 
Figure 4.3: C/N0 for G25 and R10 (high elevation satellites) 
In the first trial G25 has approximate 3 degrees higher elevation than R10, and in the 
last trial 20 minutes later this difference has increased to 13 degrees higher elevation 
for G25. The two satellites have approximate similar initial C/N0 values around 50 
and also similar C/N0 values for the periods the jammer is turned off. Figure 4.3 
shows that after the initial recovery the C/N0 values for the satellites start to fluctuate 
at approximate the same time when the distance to the jammer is about 1300 metres. 
Further, the C/N0 to G25 starts to drop at an earlier stage than R10, and acquisition is 
lost to G25 when keeping a C/N0 value of 31 while the receiver still is measuring 
C/N0 values down to 28 for R10 and continue tracking that satellite when the jammer 
is on the closest point of approach. Reacquisition for G25 occurred when C/N0 = 47 
and for R19 when C/N0 = 41. We can follow a similar pattern with earlier loss of 
acquisition and later reacquisition for the GPS satellites compared to the Glonass 
satellites through the next trials in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.4: C/N0 for G04 and R02 (low elevation satellites) 
Figure 4.4 compares the C/N0 values to G04 and R02 which both are on a low 
elevation angle around 30 degrees. They have quite the same initial C/N0 values of 
47, and the satellites are affected in the same way by the jammer as the high 
elevation satellites (Figure 4.3), with Glonass satellites maintaining signal lock for 
longer periods of time. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the observations of all the GPS and Glonass satellites in view 
throughout the four trials. 
Table 4.1: C/N0 values for GPS SV and Glonass SV. 
 GPS SV Glonass SV 
Average St. dev. Average St. dev. 
C/N0 unjammed 47.3 3.0 45.3 3.7 
C/N0 when loss of acquisition 32.7 1.8 28.1 2.7 
C/N0 for reacquisition 42.6 2.6 38.2 2.2 
 
Table 4.1 shows that the values of unjammed C/N0 have large variation. That is 
because the satellites have different elevation, and the lower elevation the more 
noise. When it comes to C/N0 for loss of acquisition and for reacquisition the 
variation is a bit lower as these values not are dependent on the elevation of the 
satellites. In the live jamming research to Bauernfeind et al. (2011) using the Ipex 
software receiver the average C/N0 value for the unjammed GPS satellites was about 
52, and as Table 4.1 shows the unjammed average C/N0 value for GPS satellites in 
this test is about 47. Since Bauernfeind’s test is conducted on lower latitudes the 
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elevation to the satellites are higher which cause higher C/N0. The Ipex software 
GPS receiver lost lock when C/N0 = 28 when exposed to a broadband jammer 
(bandwidth 11.8 MHz), and the research to Craven et al. (2013) showed that the GPS 
receiver lost lock at C/N0 = 27.8 when exposed to broadband noise (bandwidth 48 
MHz). These values are lower than for the Leica receiver in this test which lost 
acquisition at C/N0 =32.7. 
The results above indicate that the Leica receiver throughout the jamming test have 
better ability to keep track on Glonass satellites with lower C/N0 values than GPS 
satellites. Moreover, Glonass satellites have a later loss of acquisition and an earlier 
reacquisition compared to GPS satellites. Figure 4.2 – 4.4 also shows that signals 
which are received from satellites at low elevation angles are more vulnerable to 
jamming.  
4.1.3 Carrier-to-noise ratios at GPS L2 
It is moreover interesting to see that the L1 frequency jammer also has effect on 
C/N0 in the GPS L2 band which is within a band 300 MHz lower than the frequency 
band of the jammer. Figure 4.5 shows that the unjammed C/N0 on L2 has lower 
values than L1. This is generally due to the fact that the L2 power at the GPS 
satellite transmitter output is 6 dB less than on L1 with the C/A code. As the Leica 
receiver has no access to the military P-code at the L2 frequency it has to use a 
specific processing technique (semi codeless processing) in order to extract L2 phase 
and ranging measurements. As a result we get significant correlation losses and the 
C/N0 is lowered (Vladislav et al. 2013). 
 
Figure 4.5: C/N0 for GPS satellite G25 on L1 and L2 
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During the jamming we can see that the signal on L1 and L2 start to oscillate at the 
same time. When the jammer power is increasing, C/N0 on L1 starts to descend 
earlier, but when C/N0 on L1 and L2 are on the same level they continue to descend 
with the same ratio. The oscillation patterns seem to be quite similar, and loss of lock 
and reacquisition occurs at the same times. The figure shows that the processing of 
L2 is dependent of the L1 processing, and that a jammer on the L1 frequency also 
affects the L2 processing for this receiver. 
However, studying L2 performance is outside the scope of this thesis, this only give 
an indication of how dramatically the receiver is affected by the jammer. This 
specific civilian dual frequency receiver without access to the P-code gives thus no 
better protection against jamming by using two frequencies since the C/N0 for the 
satellites on L1 and L2 are affected in the same way (Figure 4.5). 
4.1.4 The first trial 
In the following Trial 1 will be discussed in depth. C/N0 values for all GPS and 
Glonass satellites tracked are plotted in addition to a plot which shows the average 
loss in C/N0 for GPS and Glonass throughout the trial. The total number of GPS and 
Glonass satellites tracked together with HDOP values is plotted in another graph, 
and at last the horizontal and height precision to the Leica receiver in GPS mode and 
combined GPS + Glonass mode are compared to the Garmin receiver in combined 
GPS + Glonass mode. All these plots for the first trial have the same time 
representation at the x-axis. 
The trial started when the jammer was on a distance of 2200 metres, but there was no 
significant effect on the C/N0 values, except from the initial dip when the jammer 
was turned on, before the jammer reached about 1300 metres. Therefore the largest 
jammer distances from 2200 to 1550 metres are removed in the following figures. 
Further we can read from Figure 4.6 and 4.7 that the closest point of the jammer was 
50 metres for about 20 seconds, and that the jammer was turned off on a distance of 
1300 metres at time 30:16 in the end of Trial 1 when the oscillating of C/N0 was 
significantly decreased. 
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Figure 4.6: Trial 1: C/N0 GPS satellites 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Trial 1: C/N0 Glonass satellites 
Figure 4.6 and 4.7 show the C/N0 for respectively each GPS satellite and each 
Glonass satellite tracked. At a jammer distance of 1300 metres at time 24:40 we can 
see that the C/N0 for GPS and Glonass start to fluctuate at the same time, but the 
GPS C/N0 start to descend at an earlier stage when the distance to jammer is about 
1000 metres (time 25:25). A significantly fall in Glonass C/N0 occur later when the 
distance is about 700 metres (time 26:10). When comparing these two figures we can 
see that the lowest C/N0 value for a GPS satellite tracked is 30 versus 25 for Glonass.  
Reacquisition for the first GPS satellite occurs at C/N0 45 versus C/N0 39 for the first 
Glonass satellite. We can also see that the two Glonass satellites with highest 
elevation remain tracked when the jammer is at the closest point of 50 metres to the 
receiver. The C/N0 for these two satellites further increase to C/N0 of about 42 and 
then the receiver stop tracking them for reasons unknown, but it might be because of 
certain algorithms within the receiver.  
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When studying the Skyplot and Figure 4.7 we can also see that the elevation of the 
Glonass satellites is of greatest significance when it comes to determine C/N0. The 
satellite with the highest elevation (R10) also has the highest C/N0, and the C/N0 
descends according to the elevation of satellites until the lowest elevation satellite 
(R18) with the lowest C/N0. One might expect that the Glonass satellites which 
transmit on the highest frequencies would be less affected by the jammer since they 
are in the very upper end of the jammer’s bandwidth, but the pattern of the higher 
elevation the higher C/N0 is consistent during the trial. 
Overall, when focusing on all GPS and Glonass satellites in view, the trial reveals 
that the receiver generally loose track on GPS satellites on an earlier stage and at 
higher C/N0 values and also have a later reacquisition at higher C/N0 values 
compared to Glonass as shown in Table 4.1. 
Further, the average C/N0 values for the GPS and Glonass satellites tracked are 
calculated, and Figure 4.8 shows the average loss in C/N0 relative to the initial values 
before jamming. 
 
Figure 4.8: Trial 1: Average loss in C/N0 for GPS and Glonass satellites 
When studying Figure 4.8 in relation to Figure 4.9, which shows the horizontal 
precision for the position solutions, we can see that the first significantly change in 
precision for the Leica GPS only solution occurred when the average loss in C/N0 for 
the GPS satellites was about 10dB (time 26:45). At this time the precision jumped 
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from around 0.2m to 6m. The precision in the combined GPS + Glonass solution 
also decreased at that point, but only from 0.2m to 0.6m. The average loss in C/N0 
for Glonass satellites at that point was about 7 dB. 
Further, the GPS fix is lost at an average C/N0 loss of 12dB (time 27:10), when still 
tracking 4 GPS satellites. At an average C/N0 loss of 14 dB less than four GPS 
satellites are tracked (time 27:16). At that point we can see the average C/N0 loss is 
decreasing because only the three satellites with highest elevation remain in the 
calculation of the average values. The combined GPS + Glonass fix is lost 5 seconds 
after the loss of the GPS only fix, but at this stage still 5 Glonass satellites are 
tracked. 4 or more Glonass satellites are tracked until the average loss in C/N0 for the 
Glonass satellites is 16dB (time 27:34). Still two Glonass satellites are tracked when 
the average loss in C/N0 is 18dB and they remain tracked when the jammer is at the 
closest point as described above.  
Reacquisition occurs first for the Glonass satellites when the average C/N0 loss is 
5dB (time 28:35) and on a later stage for the GPS satellites when the C/N0 loss is 
about 2.5dB. We can see that the reacquisition time for Glonass satellites is much 
faster than for the GPS satellites. The first 3 Glonass satellites start tracking again at 
the same time, and a few seconds later 7 Glonass satellites are tracked when just one 
GPS satellite is tracked. The position fix occurs first for the combined solution when 
3 GPS satellites and 8 Glonass satellites are tracked, and the precision for the 
combined solution is better at the time of fix than the GPS only solution as shown in 
Figure 4.9.  
A pure Glonass receiver could probably have given position fix on an earlier stage as 
the algorithm in a combined receiver requires at least one healthy GPS satellite to 
provide a combined solution because of different time reference in each system. 
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Figure 4.9: Trial 1: Horizontal Precision 
 
Figure 4.10: Trial 1: Height Precision 
 
Figure 4.9 and 4.10 show the horizontal and height precision for the Leica receiver in 
GPS only mode and combined GPS + Glonass mode and the handheld Garmin 
receiver in GPS + Glonass mode respectively. From this trial we can see that a 
combined GPS + Glonass mode gives better precision than GPS only when the 
receiver is exposed for the jammer. The gap in position solution is also shortest for 
the combined mode. We can also see that the Garmin receiver is affected by the 
jammer at an earlier stage when the interference power is lower, but provides a 
horizontal position solution which is better than 3.5 metres during the time of the 
jamming trial when the survey grade receiver gave no position. 
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As a summary of this part Figure 4.11 gives an overview of number of GPS and 
Glonass satellites tracked during Trial 1. We can see that the number of GPS 
satellites drops faster than the number of Glonass satellites when the jammer is 
approaching. During the reacquisition the number of Glonass satellites tracked grows 
with a significantly faster rate than number of GPS satellites. This figure shows that 
the Leica receiver has significantly better ability to track Glonass satellites than GPS 
satellites when exposed to the jammer. 
 
Figure 4.11: Trial 1: Number of GPS and Glonass SV tracked and HDOP 
The Horizontal Dilution of Precision (HDOP) is an important quality indicator, 
especially for the mariner. The interference degrades the performance of the receiver 
by causing loss of lock on some satellites and the HDOP (taken from NMEA data) 
increases as the geometry of the remaining satellites become worse as shown in 
Figure 4.11. 
4.1.5 The second and third trial 
The findings in the first trial with regards to horizontal precision will in this part be 
supported by the findings in the next two trials, and they will therefore only be 
briefly discussed. The difference between the trials is that the Garmin receiver is set 
in GPS only mode in Trial 3. In the two first trials it was set in combined GPS + 
Glonass mode. 
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Figure 4.12: Trial 2: Horizontal Precision 
 
Figure 4.13: Trial 3: Horizontal Precision 
The horizontal precision for Trial 2 and 3 are illustrated in Figure 4.12 and 4.13. 
These two trials also show better precision for the combined GPS + Glonass solution 
compared to the GPS only solution in the Leica receiver when the jammer has effect. 
There is also a later loss of position fix and earlier calculation of new position for the 
combined GPS + Glonass solution. 
We can see that the Garmin receiver is affected by the jammer on a longer distance, 
but it is able to keep on tracking enough satellites to make a position fix for the 
whole period when using combined GPS + Glonass mode as shown in Figure 4.12. 
In trial 3 the Garmin receiver was configured to use only GPS satellites, and as 
Figure 4.13 illustrates there is for the first time a position gap in the Garmin receiver 
which last for 7 seconds.  
59 
 
For all the trials where the Garmin receiver provided a position fix the precision in 
horizontal position was better than 4 metres. The worst horizontal precision for the 
Leica receiver in GPS only mode was about 13 metres (Trial 3) and in GPS + 
Glonass mode the worst horizontal precision was 5.5 metres in (Trial 2). 
Table 4.2 summarizes the findings from the three trials described above with regards 
to distances to the jammer when the Leica receiver loose position fix and obtains 
new position fix. The table shows that the receiver in combined GPS + Glonass 
mode tolerates higher jammer power. 
Table 4.2: Distance to jammer when loss of position and obtaining new position fix 
 Distance to jammer when loss 
of position fix (m) 
Distance to jammer when 
obtaining new position fix (m) 
GPS GPS + Glonass GPS GPS + Glonass 
Trial 1 242 171 775 749 
Trial 2 339 258 641 615 
Trial 3 267 213 766 608 
Average 283 214 727 657 
 
4.1.6 Comparison of the first trial versus simulator jamming tests 
In this part the findings from Trial 1 will be compared to the findings of Borio and 
colleagues’ (2013) which used a 12 MHz bandwidth jammer in a simulator test. 
Figure 2.11 and 2.12 in the literature review illustrate their findings. 
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Figure 4.14: Average C/N0 loss for GPS and Glonass vs distance to jammer 
Figure 4.14 shows the average C/N0 loss for the GPS and Glonass signals for Trial 1 
where the fluctuations have been smoothed out in a trendline. The distance to the 
jammer represents the x-axis. 
The figure illustrates that the Leica receiver can tolerate a loss in C/N0 of about 16 
dB for the GPS satellites before losing lock versus about 18dB for the only survey 
grade receiver that lost lock in Borio and colleagues’ (2013) test (Receiver 2) as 
shown in Figure 2.11. Their survey grade Receiver 1 and 3 tolerated losses on 
respectively 16dB and 18dB without losing lock. Also their software receiver in 
Figure 2.12 lost lock on GPS satellites at an average fall in C/N0 of 18 dB, and this 
show that the simulator test by Borio and colleagues (2013) is comparable to the live 
jamming test conducted in this trial. 
As discussed earlier regarding the Glonass satellites, we can see from Figure 4.14 
that two of the satellites are still tracked when the loss in C/N0 is more than 18dB 
when the jammer power is at the highest level. 
4.1.7 Discussion 
The static jamming test has shown that as the intensity of interference increased the 
C/N0 of both GPS and Glonass signals descend and the pseudorange measurement 
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precision declined leading to the loss of positioning precision and at last a total loss 
of lock. 
Furthermore, the test has shown that during the acquisition phase the receivers are 
much more susceptible to interference than in the tracking phase. This applies for 
both the GPS and Glonass signals, and it is mainly because the bandwidths of the 
tracking loops have to be higher during acquisition since the Doppler shift is not 
precisely known (Bauernfeind et al. 2011). When the receiver is in tracking phase 
the code and carrier tracking loops are already locked on to the signals. Such 
conditions make jamming harder, since higher power is required to unlock these 
loops. 
As a combined GPS + Glonass receiver has been used in this test it is not possible to 
give an assessment of the accuracy or precision of the Glonass system compared to 
GPS under influence of interference. We have however clearly seen that employing 
Glonass satellites in addition to GPS satellites in the receiver contribute to a later 
loss of position fix and an earlier calculation of new position. Since the Glonass PRN 
code is shorter (511 chips vs 1023 chips for GPS) as it use different frequencies to 
recognise the satellites, the receiver only have to store half as many search 
hypotheses when looking for a signal. This in turn requires less amount of RAM to 
conduct an acquisition search, and it takes shorter time to acquire the Glonass signal 
compared to GPS. 
Moreover, the test has shown a significant difference between the GPS and Glonass 
signal with regards to C/N0 values. The C/N0 ratios for Glonass are less affected by 
the jammer used in this test. As the centre frequency of the jammer was exactly at 
the GPS centre frequency it might be expected that the jammer would not influence 
the Glonass satellites in the same way as GPS satellites. The results showed that the 
Glonass satellites provided better performance as the curve for the average loss in 
C/N0 for Glonass was above the curve for GPS at all stages. However, this test 
showed that the Glonass satellites were able to continue tracking at a higher loss in 
C/N0, and that result is independent of the centre frequency of the jammer. 
An implication of the higher chipping rate for the GPS signal is a wider signal 
bandwidth, which in turn implies a need for wider RF front ends at the receiver 
compared to Glonass. Also since Glonass utilizes FDMA to separate the signals of 
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particular Glonass satellites it requires a narrower RF front-end bandwidth, and 
narrow band receivers are less impacted by the jammer since they are able to filter 
out a greater portion of the interfering signal. 
The results in this test support the findings of Vladislav and colleagues (2013) who 
studied GPS/Glonass performance under strong solar radio emission interference. 
Their results showed that GPS receivers presented lower noise immunity and that 
Glonass receiver can perform its function more reliably under conditions with solar 
emission interference. They argued that the better performance of Glonass was 
caused by the narrower front-end passband of the Glonass receiver for the separate 
Glonass satellites compared to the GPS receivers. This might also be an explanation 
to the better Glonass performance for our jamming test. 
Another aspect is that combined GPS + Glonass receivers can receive signals from 
more satellites and therefore show more resistance to jamming than a single GPS or 
Glonass receiver. The test showed clearly that availability and precision benefits of 
adding Glonass become more significant the more challenging the environment was. 
The jamming tests have showed that both the Leica and Garmin receivers have 
decreased performance in the presence of jamming and that the receivers react 
differently. Different receiver RF front-end bandwidths may allow different total 
amounts of jammer power to pass through them. As the Garmin receiver is a 
narrower-band receiver it is less impacted by jamming because it is able to filter out 
a greater portion of the interfering signal. 
The Leica receiver is interfered at a later point but loose lock on to the signal earlier 
compared to the Garmin receiver. This is in accordance with results from 
Bauernfeind et al. (2011) where professional receivers were compared with mass 
market receivers. Also Niekerk & Combrink (2012) found when testing a Garmin 
etrex receiver that this receiver had better resistance to jamming than a more 
sophisticated Garmin receiver as the receiver sensitivity plays an important role here. 
An interesting point is that the Garmin receiver provided a position solution under 
jamming condition all the time it was set in GPS + Glonass mode, but provided 
position gap when it was configured to receive GPS only.  
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4.2 Dynamic jamming test 
The dynamic part consists of two trials. In Trial 1 the Coast Guard Vessel was 
drifting slowly downstream while the jammer approached it, and in Trial 2 the Coast 
Guard Vessel steered a course towards the jammer which was static. 
The jamming effect on the three different receivers in Trial 1 will be presented first. 
Then the effect on the receivers in Trial 2 will be studied. Further the effects on the 
ECDIS system in Trial 2 will be briefly analysed, and at the end there will be a 
discussion to sum up the findings from this part. 
4.2.1 Trial 1: Jamming effects on the GPS receivers 
Figure 4.15 shows the GPS skyplot for the one hour period the dynamic test was 
conducted, and it shows especially that there are no GPS satellites with high 
elevation to the north as the measurements are conducted at high latitudes. Also in 
this trial the jammer approached from the eastern direction as illustrated in the 
skyplot. 
 
Figure 4.15: Skyplot GPS satellites 
Figure 4.16 shows the C/N0 values for all the GPS satellites tracked in trial 1, and the 
figure and skyplot show that the four satellites with the highest elevation (G24, G17, 
G14 and G12) have the highest unjammed C/N0, and these satellites are also tracked 
for the longest time when exposed to the jammer.  
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Figure 4.16: Carrier-to-noise ratios GPS satellites 
The average unjammed C/N0 is 44.8 and when the receiver lost acquisition to each 
particular satellite the average C/N0 was 38.6. For the static test the average 
unjammed C/N0 was 47.3 and the C/N0 when the receiver lost acquisition was 32.7. 
For this dynamic test the receiver only tolerated an average fall in carrier-to-noise 
ratio of 6.2 dB compared to the static test where the average tolerated fall for the 
GPS satellites was 14.6 dB. 
Because antennas for marine applications require a uniform gain pattern also below 
the horizon to compensate for the rolling and pitching of the ship they will be more 
affected by noise compared to the survey grade antennas where the gain is limited as 
far as possible to the upper hemisphere rejecting signals coming from below the 
horizon (Hofmann-Wellenhof 2008). Therefore, in addition to the dynamics of the 
vessel and larger multipath effect on board the vessel, the unjammed C/N0 levels are 
lower than in the static test. 
According to Rao et al. (2013) C/N0 threshold levels of between 30 and 35 are 
acceptable for antennas on platforms that are moving, and the receiver in this test 
lost acquisition already when the C/N0 descended to 38.6. However, the C/N0 values 
depends on the antenna used, the receiver and the dynamics of the platform together 
with the setup which means that different receiver and antenna combination and 
cables with varying resistances show different C/N0 patterns. 
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Figure 4.17: Number of GPS satellites tracked by Leica and Furuno receiver 
Figure 4.17 shows the number of GPS satellites tracked by the Leica and Furuno 
receiver, which are connected to the same antenna. Both Figure 4.16 and 4.17 show 
that the last position fix for the Leica receiver occurs when the number of satellites 
tracked falls from 5 to 4. At that time the distance to the jammer is about 200 metres. 
Already at a distance of 1200 metres the Furuno receiver gives it first position gap 
and the position is completely lost at a distance to jammer of 800 metres. This figure 
shows that the Leica receiver has significantly better ability to track noisy satellites 
compared to the Furuno receiver. 
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Figure 4.18: Position plot provided by the three receivers (Trial 1) 
Figure 4.18 shows the position solution provided by the three receivers for the same 
time period as Figure 4.17. At a distance to the jammer of about 1600 metres the 
Furuno receiver provided a course over ground (COG) in south-eastern direction 
when the vessel was drifting to the north-east. As also shown in Figure 4.17 we can 
see the first position gaps when the distance to jammer was about 1200 metres and 
further that the position was completely lost at a distance of 800 metres to the 
jammer. At that point the difference between the Furuno and Leica position solution 
was about 15 metres. The Leica receiver made some smaller jump in the position 
during this trial, and we can see that Garmin and Leica followed almost the same 
track. The Leica receiver lost position when the distance to the jammer was about 
200 metres. The Garmin receiver provided a consistent position with no gaps during 
this trial until it lost its position about 100 metres from the jammer. 
Equally to the findings of Grant and colleagues (2010) the marine grade receiver 
started to provide significant misleading information when the jammer power was 
weak, already at distances of 1600 metres in this trial. 
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4.2.2 Trial 2: Jamming effects on the GPS receivers 
In this trial the Coast Guard Vessel approached the jammer, and Figure 4.19 shows 
the position solution provided by the three receivers on board. The Coast Guard 
Vessel approached the jammer with a speed of about 5 knots (2.5 m/s). The scale in 
this plot is about 15 times smaller than in Figure 4.18 when the Coast Guard Vessel 
was drifting as shown in the lower left corner.  
 
Figure 4.19: Position plot provided by the three receivers (Trial 2) 
The first position gap by the Furuno receiver occurred at a distance of 1100 metres 
versus 550 metres for the Leica receiver. At a distance of 700 metres the Furuno 
receiver provided its last position versus 250 metres for the Leica receiver. The 
Garmin receiver provided consistent position until a distance of about 100 metres to 
the jammer. 
In Figure 4.20 the area for the first position gap to the Furuno receiver at about 1100 
metres is zoomed in. Here we can see the inconsistency of the Furuno positon while 
the Leica and Garmin receivers provide approximate parallel position solutions in a 
straight line. 
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Figure 4.20: Position plot provided by the three receivers (Trial 2) 
We have thus seen that even though the Furuno and Leica receiver are connected to 
the same antenna they provide significantly different position performance during 
these two trials. 
4.2.3 Trial 2: Jamming effects on ECDIS  
Figure 4.21 gives an overview of the NMEA inputs to the Electronic Chart Display 
and Information System (ECDIS) on board the Coast Guard Vessel.  
 
Figure 4.21: NMEA inputs to the ECDIS 
The primary position system is the Furuno GP90 receiver (GPS1) which is 
previously discussed in trial 1 and 2. This receiver gives also the primary COG 
(Course over Ground) and SOG (Speed over Ground) input. The secondary position 
input is the Furuno FA-150 Automatic Identification System (AIS) which has a 12-
channels internal GPS receiver. The AIS provides the secondary input for COG, 
SOG and heading. Primary sensor for heading is the gyro compass (Raytheon 
Anschutz std 22), and for speed through water (STW) the only sensor is the 
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electromagnetic log (EM log). When the position input 1 is lost the fall back chain is 
set to start applying position input 2 automatically. On this ECDIS the last backup 
source for navigation calculations are dead reckoning (DR) based on the gyro 
compass and EM log. In sum the main functions which relates to plotting of the 
vessel’s position on the ECDIS, except from the primary heading and STW, are 
basically dependent on the GPS. 
 
Figure 4.22: Alarm list on ECDIS 
When the Coast Guard Vessel approached the jammer many alarms started to sound 
on the bridge. On the ECDIS screen as shown in Figure 4.22 these alarms were 
linked to the failure of the two GPS receivers (Position input 1 and 2) to provide 
position inputs, and their loss of ability to calculate SOG and COG. Alarms on the 
two receiver’s main displays also started sounding as shown for the AIS in Figure 
4.23. 
 
Figure 4.23: EPFS (Electronic Position Fixing System) alarm on AIS 
The primary position sensor was the first sensor that was lost during this trial, and 
the loss occurred for the first time at a distance of 1100 metres from the jammer as 
shown in Figure 4.19. After that there was a large gap and a last single position fix 
was provided 700 metres from the jammer at time 17:42:31. As these gaps occurred 
the position from the secondary sensor was chosen automatically. As we can see 
from Figure 4.22 the alarm for lost primary position sensor was activated at time 
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17:42:32. This was one second after the receiver gave its last position fix. The 
secondary position was lost much closer to the jammer and the alarm occurred at 
time 17:45:11 when the distance to the jammer was about 200 metres. The integrated 
GPS receiver in the AIS is a less sophisticated receiver than the primary receiver, 
and that might be the reason why it is more resistant to jamming. 
Figure 4.24 is a screenshot of the ECDIS, and we can see that there has been a jump 
in the position after the primary position sensor gave its last single position fix 700 
metres from the jammer. Before and after that position fix the AIS provided its 
position input as secondary sensor. 
 
Figure 4.24: Screenshot ECDIS (Trial 2) 
As soon as the secondary position sensor was lost at time 17:45:11 Dead Reckoning 
(DR) calculations started in the ECDIS. These calculations were based on the 
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heading from the gyro compass (HDT – Heading True) and speed from the EM log 
(STW – Speed through Water). The only notice of the start of DR positioning was 
the yellow squared menu that appeared in the upper right corner of the ECDIS 
screen. In that DR menu it was possible to set corrections to HDT and STW 
manually as it is necessary to adjust for biases caused by current and wind. 
An important observation was that the gyro compass was equipped with automatic 
speed and latitude error correction that took directly input from only the primary 
GPS receiver. There was no operator panel or any other possibilities to enter speed 
and latitude manually to the gyro compass, which implies that for longer times with 
GPS outage the gyro errors will grow. This lack of ability to give manually latitude 
and speed input to the gyro is a problem that is highly recommended to be resolved. 
Also the EM log was affected by errors and these errors were in order of 1 to 1.5 
knots. The recommendation is to calibrate this log once a year, but there has been no 
routine for calibrating the EM log on board as this sensor is rarely used. 
As shown in Figure 4.24 the AIS on board the small boat equipped with the jammer 
provided a speed vector indicating a speed of more than 10m/s. At this time this boat 
was dead in water. 
4.2.4 Discussion 
The first dynamic trial showed that the Furuno receiver provided erroneous positions 
data when the jammer was on a distance of 800 to 1600 metres. Until the first gap in 
the position that occurred when the jammer was on a distance of 1200 metres there 
were no indications of a wrong position or any alarms on the bridge, and there was 
no system that captured the difference in about 90 degrees between the COG from 
the primary GPS and the gyro heading. At this phase no one on the bridge took 
notice of the wrong position and COG that was presented on the ECDIS. 
When the jammer power increased a lot of alarms started to sound simultaneously in 
different parts of the bridge, and most of the attention to the navigators was related to 
recognise and acknowledge these alarms.  
The results from the first trial showed that the survey grade receiver did not provide 
erroneous positions to the same extent as the marine grade receiver. Instead of 
providing wrong positions the survey grade receiver stopped providing any position 
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when the interference from the jammer was high enough. When navigating this is 
clearly the preferred situation as providing erroneous position may lead the 
navigators to fail to recognise that the GPS is being interfered with. Continuation of 
safe navigation is dependent on the ability to recognise that the GPS service is being 
denied at the first stage and then operate safely using alternative navigation 
techniques in order to manually update the position. 
As previously discussed the jamming on Pole Star led to no updating of the ECDIS 
which according to Grant and colleagues (2010) resulted in a static screen and 
further, in the Flamborough trial the ECDIS gave an alarm and closed down (ibid). 
Unlike these two trials discussed by Grant et al. (2010), the ECDIS in this trial 
provided an adequate response to loss of GPS positions as the DR system started to 
calculate new positions based on heading from the gyrocompass and speed from the 
EM log. There were alarms when the primary and secondary position sensors were 
lost, but no alarms that indicated that the system had started DR. Therefore some of 
the navigators did not recognise that the positon of the vessel automatically was 
plotted forward, and there was also a lack of skill to manually correct the position of 
the vessel in DR mode as some of the navigators had never done this before. 
These findings support the findings by Grant et al. (2010) who claimed that sailing in 
area where the jamming signals is weak is the worst situation as the navigation 
system might give false but plausible positions and velocities but not providing any 
alarms. When the vessel entered the area with higher jammer power a lot of alarms 
started to sound, and there were no doubt on the bridge that there was something 
wrong with the GPS system. 
Moreover, the results have shown that the Leica and Garmin receiver have better 
jamming resistance and provide significantly better performance than the marine 
grade Furuno receiver under jamming conditions. We have also seen that the 
secondary position sensor on board has better jamming resistance than the primary 
position sensor. These findings are important for the crew to be aware of, and the 
Furuno GP90 receiver should not be recommended to be used in any scenarios where 
a jamming threat might be possible as it provide more false positions and loose its 
position fix at an earlier stage compared to the Leica and Garmin receiver. 
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5 Conclusion 
This research has revealed that GPS is very vulnerable to jamming, and that different 
receivers reacts quite differently to radio frequency interference. 
The research has further shown that applying the Glonass system in addition to GPS 
might provide benefits with regards to reliability and redundancy, especially in 
Northern areas. We have also seen that signals from satellites with high elevations 
reach the receiver antennas with higher signal strength and therefore are more 
resistant to a jammer on sea level. Glonass provides more satellites with higher 
elevation and has better coverage in Northern areas, and because it applies a different 
modulation technique than GPS the use of both systems would provide better 
redundancy. 
Carrier-to-noise ratios have proven to be a good quality indicator of GNSS signals, 
and Glonass signals has shown to be more resistant to jamming than GPS signals as 
more jammer power is needed to affect the carrier-to-noise ratios. Further, the survey 
grade receiver has shown ability to track Glonass signals on lower carrier-to-noise 
ratios than GPS signals. 
The static test has also showed that utilizing the Leica receiver in combined GPS + 
Glonass mode provides a later loss of lock and earlier acquisition when exposed to a 
jammer than in GPS only mode. The pseudorange precision has also appeared to be 
better in combined mode under difficult jamming conditions. It is worth to mention 
that this might be caused by the fact that the receiver in combined mode has more 
satellites to choose among and the better coverage of the Glonass system, not 
necessarily because of better jamming resistance for the Glonass signals. 
Moreover, for maritime navigation a weak jamming signal seems to be more 
dangerous than a high powered jamming signal, since it can cause GPS receivers to 
give misleading information without warning. It is also important for navigators to 
be aware of how jammers have impact on GNSS receivers, as this to a great extent is 
dependent on which type of receiver that is used. It is better that the GNSS receiver 
stops providing data than giving a false COG and position like the Furuno receiver, 
which were especially shown in the first dynamic trial where the difference in COG 
and heading from the gyro compass was about 90 degrees.  
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6 Recommendations 
Since this study has applied a combined GPS + Glonass receiver, further research 
should focus on signal reception and accuracy of a pure Glonass receiver exposed to 
jamming. There has been little research of jamming of the Glonass system, and 
because a combined receiver has been utilized in this research there are no 
measurements of the accuracy the Glonass system is able to provide under jamming 
conditions.  
By looking at carrier-to-noise ratios this research showed that the GPS signals on the 
L2 frequency in the Leica receiver was affected to a quite similar extent as the L1 
frequency by this L1 jammer. It thus seems that this dual frequency receiver is not 
better protected against jamming than a single frequency receiver and further studies 
might focus attention to this aspect. 
As different receivers react quite differently to jamming, military vessels that utilize 
other navigation systems than the system exposed to this test should test their 
systems to make an assessment of its jamming resistance and further make an 
assessment of how their ECDIS system is able to handle a loss of position sensors. 
Moreover, knowledge and skills in manually correcting the ship's position in DR 
mode by utilizing traditional means of navigation should be attained, as this seems to 
be a success factor for safe navigation under jamming conditions. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Specifications Leica GS10 and AS10 
 
(Extracted from: www.leica-geosystems.com) 
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Appendix B: Specifications Furuno GP90 
 
(Extracted from: www.furuno.com/en) 
